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REVIEWS
A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH. By Wiley Rutledge. Lawrence: The
University of Kansas Press, 1947. Pp. 82. $2.00.
In this small but inspiring book, an Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court sandwiches a semi-technical discussion of the Commerce
Clause between two layers of political philosophy. Indeed, what is essen-
tially political philosophy is as ill-concealed in that part of the volume deal-
ing with interstate commerce as it is in the author's judicial opinions. The
middle of the book is pretty good; the first and last parts eloquent. The
reader can hardly escape the emotional sincerity and intellectual integrity
which characterizes every page and line.
The Commerce Clause, the author believes, is the central core of our na-
tional unity. The fathers wrought even better than they knew. "By a stroke
as bold as it proved successful, they founded a nation, although they had set
out only to find a way to reduce trade restrictions." 1 From it has evolved a
mighty continent of free trade, mighty because trade was free; a continent
and a democracy able to triumph over depression and war and, for good or ill,
to assume leadership in a shattered world.
The Commerce Clause is a uniquely federal instrument. In all the bril-
liant bickering and strategic statesmanship of the making of the Constitu-
tion, perhaps the greatest stroke of genius was that which incorporated the
twelve magic words: "The Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate Com-
merce .. .among the several States. . . ." The Clause was to become the
greatest monument to the vision of those who realistically appraised the
toughest problem at hand and ahead. "More than any other provision,
it has had to do with dashes of federal and state power, the lines of their
division and their reconciliation in the federal plan." 2
In language sufficiently technical to be accurate and popular enough to
be intelligible to laymen, the Justice writes briefly on the major problems
undbr the Commerce Clause. He develops the views of Marshall and Taney,
and the conflicting interpretations which have evolved therefrom, with ap-
propriate credit to both jurists for their contributions to the continuous solu-
tion required in a dynamic nation. To Marshall must be attributed the es-
tablishment of the judicial role in the accommodation of the powers over
commerce to the federal system. "Gibbons v. Ogden, will stand for the life
of the federal system as a landmark in Commerce Clause law, as it will also
in the law of federal supremacy and of the place of judicial power in the
scheme." ' Cooley v. Board of Wardens detracts but little from the luster of
Marshall's achievement. Taney, differing from Marshall as to the exclusive-
ness of federal power, is entitled to major credit for the realistic manipula-
tion of the Clause to permit desirable if not necessary State action. "For
him, it may be surprising to those who know him only as the author of an
1. P. 26.
2. P.33.
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opinion in the Dred Scott case, the nation and the States were not essential
antagonists, each seeking to exclude the other from power. He was rather
a statesman of great common sense, except in the single instance, devoted
to making workable accommodation between the two great powers in the
federal scheme and giving appropriate play for each to act." 4
The author not only traces the swing of the pendulum of federal power
across its narrowing and lengthening arc, but develops the conflicting inter-
pretations of the implied prohibition upon State power. One, rooted in Mar-
shall's conviction of exclusive Congressional power, which declares the pro-
hibition self operating in the Clause itself; the other, evolved from Taney's
views, that the intention of Congressional silence is the touchstone by which
to determine the limits of State action.5 Although recognizing that the si-
lence of Congress may on occasion mean merely that it has no attitude at
all and disavowing the major premise of the self-executing character of the
Commerce Clause, the Justice appears to find value in both views as afford-
ing the Court necessary latitude for handling Commerce Clause problems.
The author is at his best in his declaration of faith in federal democracy.
He believes in law. He also believes in freedom. And he knows that each of
these things may destroy the other. But he also knows "that without both,
neither can long endure." Man, he believes, instinctively denies the validity
of anarchism as he intuitively shrinks from despotism. He therefore seeks
to reconcile the opposing extremes, and in doing so, is motivated by the de-
sire for justice. Justice in the abstract, for the author, is but the source from
which concrete justice springs. In its finite form, justice is neither complete
nor perfect. It is, on the other hand, incomplete, imperfect and everchang-
ing. The federal system, the author believes, is the only political framework
within which man's conflicting objectives can sucessfully be reconciled. His
exaggerated evaluation of the Commerce Clause is based on this conviction.
Like all idealists, Justice Rutledge reaches for something which probably
isn't there. He would apply the federal plan to the entire world. He thus
marks himself as an incurable internationalist. If there are any copies of this
little book left after World War III and if there is anybody left alive who can
read, he will reflect sadly upon the tragedy of a civilization which could not
bring itself to follow the path which Justice Rutledge, along with all too few
others, pointed.
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